Admissions

Reference: The Indian Evidence Act

Sections 17 to 31

Admissions admit or concede facts asserted by the opposite party and thereby do away with the need to produce evidence in support of those facts. Thus, they suggest an inference as to facts in issue or relevant facts. They may be oral, documentary or electronic and may be:
§ Made by specified persons (Sections 18 to 20)
§ Made in specified circumstances (Section 21 and confessions under Sections 23, 24 and 26 to 30)
§ Excluded (Sections 22, 23 and confessions under Sections 25)
Section 31 speaks of the effect of admissions.
There is a general observation in ‘Phipson on Evidence’ that any relevant statement made by a party is evidence which may be used against him. The weight which should be given to it is, however, a completely different matter.
In English Law, the term ‘admission’ is used in civil cases while ‘confession’ is used in criminal cases. This distinction has not been clearly defined in the Indian Evidence Act although many authors seem to make it while speaking of Indian law as well. As far as the Indian Evidence Act is concerned, Sections 17 to 21 apply to both civil and criminal cases. Further, not every admission made by an accused in a criminal case is a confession. But any admission, to have the effect of substantive evidence, must be voluntary.
Also, as has been stated in ‘Wigmore on Evidence’, it is not absolutely necessary that every admission made is an admission made against the interest of the maker. A reflection of this can be seen in Section 22 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Admissions by specified persons

Under Section 18:
§ Statements made by a party to the proceeding
o What is admitted by a party must be presumed to be true unless the contrary is shown. (Nathoo Lal v. Durga Prasad, 1954)
o There must be a clear and unambiguous statement by the party. (Nagubai v. B Shama Rao)
§ By an agent to any such party whom the Court considers authorized
§ By a suitor in representative character e.g. executors, trustees, administrators
§ By a party interested in the subject-matter
§ By a person from whom interest has been derived
There should be privity i.e. a mutual or successive relationship to the same right in property. Privity may be: (1) privity in blood: heir, ancestor, coparcener, etc., (2) privity in law: executor & testator, heir & intestate, (3) privity in estate or interest: vendor/vendee, lessor/lessee
Under Section 19:
§ Statements made by persons whose position or liability it is necessary to prove liability
(See Sivalinagm v. Sakthivel, 1989)
Under Section 20:
§ Statements made by referees

Illustration to Section 19:
A undertakes to collect rents for B. B sues A for not collecting rent due from C to B. A denies that rent was due from C to B.
Explanation to the Illustration:
A statement by C that he owed B rent is an admission, and is a relevant fact as against A, if A denies that C did owe rent to B. It is required to prove C’s liability to prove A’s liability. If a suit was filed against C, the statement would be relevant against C if he made it when he was under liability. Hence, his statement is relevant in the suit against A.

It was held in Queen Empress v. Tribhovandas Manekchand, 1884, that a confession which is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding may be used as an admission in a civil proceeding.
An admission may be a judicial admission or an informal/casual/evidentiary admission. The former i.e. judicial admissions under Section 58 are considered to be on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. Judicial admissions are binding on their makers, constitute a waiver of proof and can be the foundation of rights. (Satish Mohan v. State of UP, 1986) As opposed to this, evidentiary admissions which may be received at the trial as evidence are not conclusive and are rebuttable.
There has been some amount of debate as to whether the rule on admissions is an exception to the rule disallowing hearsay. On one hand, the hearsay rule came into force after the rules governing admissions but on the other, the basis of hearsay (i.e. the inability to cross-examine the maker of the statement) does not exist as far as admissions are concerned. The Supreme Court has accepted the later contention in Union of India v. Mokshi Brothers, 1977.